Ryan Houghton: Northern Ireland and Brexit
This is part of a series of posts taken from my undergraduate work in 2018/19, as such the facts written may now be dated and the views expressed no longer relevant.
Welcome to the Ryan Houghton Medium blog page. This is part 3 of the Brexit and the view on the future of the union. On the previous blog, we talked about the The UK System & The Scottish independence Referendum. Today, lets tackle more about the Northern Ireland’s exit from the UK.
Since the Irish Republic’s departure from the Commonwealth in 1949, Northern Ireland’s exit from the UK has altered from requiring the will of Stormont, to the will of the Northern Irish people by referendum (Bogdanor, 2018:116). The legal process of self determination for Northern Ireland was codified in the 1998 Belfast Agreement (Bogdanor, ibid). This contrasts with the devolution agreements for Scotland and Wales, where no such similar language exists. This is perhaps understandable as Northern Ireland’s troubled circumstances have often required bespoke solutions for governance matters (Elliot and Thomas, 2017:305). Akin to its devolved neighbours, Northern Ireland’s future relationship with the EU will be determined fully by the British government. This was made clear by the UK Supreme Court judgment in deciding the Miller Case (R (Miller) Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 2017). A bespoke solution may be required yet again for Northern Ireland in the resulting Brexit agreement between the UK and EU.
Northern Ireland’s political history and strong pro EU vote in the referendum, mixed with the lack of a governing political administration in Stormont, create a challenge to the Union’s stability. Stability overtly challenged by the then deputy First Martin McGuinness, who on the morning of the Brexit result called for a border poll to give the electorate in Northern Ireland the opportunity to vote for reunification (Fenton, 2016). A modern-day reinvention of the phrase touted in the 1916 rising, ‘England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity’ (Bell, 2016). A key consideration for the UK in relation to Northern Ireland is the border with the Irish Republic; the consequences of mishandling this are grave.
Northern Ireland is the only constituent nation of the UK sharing a land border with a foreign state; this alone presents a unique challenge requiring delicate handling (Tonge, 2017). Northern Ireland has frequently been a contentious topic within the ongoing negotiations between the UK and EU and is consistently discussed in media reports (Bienkov and Payne, 2018). Membership of the European Union is woven into the language of Belfast Agreement. This agreement was the formalisation of the peace process after years of sectarian violence. An aspect of this agreement allowed those born in Northern Ireland to choose British and/or Irish citizenship. Further, under the Anglo Irish Common Travel Area agreements, in effect from 1922 and legislated for at different stages since 1925, freedom of movement has been the norm. The question now is how can this continue in a manner satisfactory to all parties?
There does appear to be broad political support for the CTA, at least at the domestic political level (Foster and McGuinness, 2016). As members of the EU, the UK and Ireland have used exclusive provisions under Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty to ‘make arrangements between themselves relating to the movement of persons between their territories’ (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). Protecting the CTA was designated by the UK as one of its priorities in its white paper on negotiations with the EU (UK Government, 2017). This has received a positive reception from the Irish government; however, so far in the negotiations, the EU has not been as forthcoming. In its own starting principles for negotiation with the UK, the EU has made clear ‘its priority will be internal integration over relations with non-member states’ (Tonge, 2017). This approach led to some like Ray Bassett, Ireland’s former top civil servant, calling for closer ties with the UK in pursuit of a strong Brexit deal, in face of an EU pursuing a ‘super state agenda’ (Halligan, 2018).
The EU’s proposals on the border question have caught the ire of Unionist politicians. The latest proposal as part of the draft transition deal from Michel Barnier, the EU’s lead negotiator, suggested a set-up where full regulatory alignment between the north and south of the island is maintained (Boffey and Rankin, 2018). DUP leader Arlene Foster, who was the only devolved administration leader advocating for Brexit, strongly condemned the proposal from Barnier (Boffey, 2018).
For Unionists like Foster, Brexit has dangerous implications for the stability of the Union from a Northern Irish perspective. Any attempt to create a difference in status between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK is not something they will entertain.
As touched on above, the arithmetic in the House of Commons places a heavy dependency on the DUP by the Conservative government making the task of the UK government difficult. It has a broad range of interests to defend in the negotiations from all corners of industry and society. How far it is willing to go to defend the ‘precious, precious bond between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’ (May, 2016), will be first tested in its resolution of the border question.
Ryan Houghton is a penultimate year law student at the University of Aberdeen and an RAF veteran with extensive experience in politics and local government. Learn more about Ryan Houghton here. Follow Ryan Houghton on Twitter. Read the latest Ryan Houghton news here.